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ABSTRACT 
A methodology for a statistical trend analysis (STA) in failure 
rates is presented. It applies primarily to relatively rare events in 
changing technologies or components. The formulation is more general and 
the assumptions are less restrictive than in a previously published version. 
Relations of the statistical analysis and probabilistic assessment (PRA) 
are discussed in terms of categorization of decisions for action following 
particular failure events. The significance of tentatively identified 
trends is explored. In addition to statistical tests for trend significance, 
a combination of STA and PRA results quantifying the trend complement is 
proposed. The STA approach is compared with other concepts for trend 
characterization. 
INTRODUCTION 
The drive of engineers to improve the functioning of a device or a 
!arger technical system is as old as the engineering profession. Along 
with this drive to reduce the chances for failures goes the tendency to 
reduce and limit their consequences. Thus, with either failure-probability 
or consequences, or both being reduced during the development of technical 
systems, the "risk", i.e. the product of failure probability and associated 
consequences, is normally reduced even more. As the evolution of technologies 
is an ongoing process, one can normally expect a trend of declining failure 
rates and risk. 
If the risk of a unit of a certain technology were a constant, invariable 
with time and the same for all units, the deployment of more and more units 
would imply a linear increase of the overall risk exposure. However, the 
continuing improvements (that are in part based on learning from operating experience 
including major failures) invalidate the premise. Thus, the long-term 
trend of failure rates (or risk) is not a linearly increasing function. 
It could even decrease if the (annual) reduction of total failure rate 
in the existing population exceeds the failure rate contribution of the 
new additions. The presentation of a methodology for the statistical evaluation 
of the longer-term trends, that can be deduced from the actuarial data on 
failures or accidents, is the main subject of this paper. 
A first characterization of the operating experience, e.g. in terms 
of failures (within a certain category), can be obtained by forming an 
overall average rate for the entire operating period for a single system or 
component, for several systems or for the entire "population." If improvements 
are made in the systems, one is interested in their success that should sub-
sequently be exhibited in the actuarial data as a trend of declining failure rates. 
Again, average values over the operating experience in temporal segments 
2 
could be employed to give a first characterization of the trend. However, 
if the data are sparse, the formation of a sequence of average values may 
hardly be meaningful. Thus, a more sophisticated trend analysis procedure, 
based on the temporal spacings between individual events may be advised 
(statistical trend analysis, STA). A special version of such a methodology 
has been developed in Refs. I and 2. It is briefly reviewed Ln Sec. I. 
Traditionally, the reduction of fail~re possibilities LS achieved 
by applying general as well as system-specific experience 
through the various phases of the development of a technology, starting with 
small-scale experimental models, proceeding through prototype and demonstration 
units to commercial application on an increasing scale. Applications of 
good engineering practice and judgment in the general development and in 
correcting the causes of failures is combined with more mathematical reliability 
assessment techniques (see e.g. Ref. 3) and - especially for the nuclear 
reactor technology - with probabilistic risk assessment, PRA (see e.g. 
Refs. 4 through 7). 
Detailed preanalysis with the PRA methodology leading to an "acceptable" 
design could be viewed as a superior alternative to the quasi-continuous system 
improvements through learning from operating experiences and failures. However, 
there are strong interrelations between the two approaches that may result 
Ln an "evolutionary pressure" toward continuing system improvement even Ln 
a case of an already "acceptable" design. These questions are addressed 
Ln Sec. II. 
Section III then contains the generalized STA methodology followed 
Ln Section IV by a discussion of the evaluation of the statistical significance 
of a tentatively identified trend. In additon to a purely statistical evaluation 
of the spacing data, a combination of STA and PRA results for evaluating 
the complement of the trend is proposed to establish the trend significance 
by extensive application of prior information. Trend analysis, trend 
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significance considerations and the comparative merits of different approaches 
to estimate current failure rates are illustrated for the U.S. nuclear 
power technology as an example. Finally, the essential aspects are summarized 
in a concluding section. 
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I. STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF MAJOR FAlLURES 
The first version of a statistical trend evaluation of failure events (STA) 
along the line pursued here - was published in 1979 under the title 
"Statistical Evaluation of Major Human Errors During the Development of 
New Technological Systems" (Ref. 1). The aim was to provide an evaluation 
methodology for the learning process that accompanies normally the early 
evolution of new technologies. Often, some important aspects in 
the design of the hardware or the operational instructions are overlooked 
or misjudged during this phase. These deficiencies tend to soon become 
apparent, causing a disruption in the operation, a major failure or even 
an accident. Subsequently, the just revealed deficiencies are normally 
eliminated by proper design modifications such that a recurrence of the 
respective failures is precluded or at least considerably reduced in its 
likelihood. 
In preparing the application of this methodology to the evolution of 
commercial nuclear power in the U.S. several additional aspects needed for 
a practical application have been introduced in Ref. 2. At first the failure 
events to be dealt with had to be characterized more precisely: 
The normal design process includes the consideration of many failure 
modes leading to proper design adjustments such that their appearence as 
failure events is either precluded or sufficiently unlikely. What remains 
then is a residuum of failure modes that is to be distinguished from those that 
have been overlooked or misjudged. The terms IFM and UFM have been used in Ref. 2, 
designating a priori "identified failure modes" and "unidentified failure modes" 
respectively. 
As with most classifications in two broad categories, there is a 
variety of cases in between. Actually, a continuous transition from clear 
IFM- into clear UFM-events is employed below to conceptually link proba-
bilistic with event-oriented statistical analyses. 
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The basic model assumptions of Ref. I were that deficiencies (of the 
UFM-type) are built in a system from the beginning, and their chance of 
occurrence can be described by constant values \k. Furthermore, it was 
assumed that - after one of these failures had occurred - the just revealed 
failure mode would be designed out by proper system modifications, reducing 
its chance of recurring to zero. In addition the failure modes were assumed 
to be statistically independent. 
Naturally, neither the value of any of these \ nor their total number 
can be known. However, since they are built in with a cons·tant occurrence 
rate, they all have a chance to occur at any time. Thus, it is the sum of 
all (still) existing \ that determines the present total rate of occurrence, 
L. If the K-I values of \, that have revealed themselves first, have already 
been eliminated, the present total rate of occurrence is given by 
(I) 
where the dots indicate the unknown upper limit of the sum (if the remairring 
\k become smaller and smaller, an upper limit is irrelevant). In a sense, 
LK is the "residual" occurrence rate that comprises the total of all UFM 
possibilities, measured by their \k , that are still left in the system. 
The key aspect of this statistical evaluation method is that the 
total of the \k determines the rate of occurrence and thus the temporal 
spacing (~Tk )*; therefore the spacing, ~Tk,of actual events allows us to 
infer or estimate the current residual occurrence rate LK by proper inversion 
The inverse of the properly averaged spacings gives the ~-estimate. 
The inverse of individual spacings however reflects the statistical fluctuations 
r The operating time of a single unit or of a multitude of units is denoted 
by "T", whereas lower case "t" is used for the time variable. 
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that could be very large as shown in Section 2. The application of the 
individual 6tk for estimating ~ could therefore suggest an increase, if 
a particular spacing is incidentally small. However, if there is prior 
information that suggests system improvement~ here described by A-elimination 
in Eq. (I), one may want to analyze the data for a "decliniri.g failure rate" 
(DFR). Thus, spurious increases need tobe eliminated. 
The isotonic regression procedure, introduced in I972 by Barlow 
et al. (Ref. 8) appears to be ideally suited for the elimination of 
statistical perturbations from a tentatively assumed trend, since it applies 
the least modification of the original data, the 6Tk values (see also 
Ref. I). It approximates the 6Tk by a sequence 6Tk in a least square sense, 
subjected to the order restriction of non-decreasing estimates. It merely 
eliminates the statistical decreases of the 61k(and thus the corresponding 
increases of the ~-estimates), in order to identify the magnitude of a 
tentatively assumed trend (such as "declining failure rate", DFR). With 
6Tk (k = I ... K) being the result of the isotonic regression, the L-estimates 
are obtained as 
k = I ••• K, (2) 
which describe a declining failure rate 
(3) 
The equal sign that may appear between some of the ~-values reflects the 
fact that spurious increases are removed by the least possible adjustments. 
If in a special case, the 6Tk should increase monotoneously by themselves, 
no isotonic regression adjustment is needed. Then, the simple inversion of 
the NI'k-values yields a monotoneaus ~-estimate. In order to distinguish 
it from Eq. (2) it is called "non-isotonic" estimate, denoted by ~: 
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(4) 
If the ~Tk arenot monotoneously increasing, Eq. (4), i.e. the ~-values, 
reflect the spurious increases. 
The entire set of spacing data could also be combined to yield an 
average occurrence rate L with 
K 
= K( L 
k=l 
(5) 
-H 
where TK is the total operation time. Forming Lk after each failure event 
-H gives a quantity that is called here the historical average rate, Lk 
It also reflects a trend, but normally in a considerably reduced way. A 
-H ~ 
comparative discussion of Lk and ~ is included in Sec. V. 
Apparently, the trend analysis with isotonic regression yields more 
detailed information from the same data than the average characterization, 
Eq. (5). This is possible since additional information has been used, 
i.e. the data are analyzed in conjunction with "prior information." namely 
that a decreasing trend can be expected because of the elimination of 
recognized failure possibilities or a reduction of their likelihood. The 
tentatively identified trend must then be subjected to a test of its 
statistical significance (see Section IV). No explicit allowance for 
-H 
possible learning is made in the historical average value Lk. 
Eyery J?ailu-re contriliutes "one•• to the numerator (K) of Fq. (5) and remains 
there for all times, not accounting for design modifications, even if they 
preclude a recurrence. 
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11. STATISTICAL VS.PROBABILISTIC CONSIDERATIONS ON FAlLURES 
The differences and interrelations of event-oriented safety analysis 
(STA) and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) reflect the methodological and 
conceptual differences of statistics and probabilistics~ 
Probabilistic evaluations employ the asymptotic concepts "probability" and 
"average rate." Actuarial data are used to estimate or construct these 
asymptotic quantities. Limitations of an actual data base appear then 
1.n form of "inaccuracies" of the estimated average concepts, described 
by standard deviations or confidence intervals. 
Statistics on the other hand is the methodology of drawing inferences 
directly from the data base, without conceptually employing and without 
necessarily aiming at average concepts. 
If a trend is superimposed on a sparse data base, e.g. because the 
system or the technology keeps changing while a sparse data base is assembled, 
average concepts may be of questional descriptive value. One may then 
obtain more revealing information by the evaluation of the trend as such. 
In the extreme case that failures or accidents are so unlikely that 
no actuarial data exist at all, an evaluation must resort to the construction 
or synthesis techniques of the probabilistic approach. 
It therefore appears that the domain for an application of statistical 
trend analysis techniques is between the frequent small failures:that provide an ex-
tensive data base for the formation of a sequence of average values,and the extreme 
unlikely failures for which no actuarial data exist at all. Thus statistical 
trend analysis (STA) appears to be called for in the evaluation of sparse 
data for changing system~, where the "system" may be a_larger unit or merely 
a component of it or altei~ately a population of units such as an entire 
technology. 
The discussion of the interrelations of STA and PRA is based on the 
consideration of the timing uncertainty of actuarial events. It is assumed 
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that - through extensive preanalysis of the safety characteristics of a 
design - all "unacceptable" identified failure modes (IFM) have been 
eliminated. The remaining or. "residual" risk is deemed "acceptable." 
The term "acceptable" in this context does not reflect the risk 
perception aspects. It merely refers to a set of design decisions which 
distinguish between "accepted" and "unaccepted" failure modes. Still the 
term "acceptable" is used here (rather than the more precise term "accepted") 
to indicate the judgmental component ~n safety decisions. 
The design decisions that result from these acceptability considerations 
form the technical basis for the quantification with PRA. Let L be the 
PRA-calculated acceptable average residual occurrence rate for failures 
within a certain category and C the corresponding average consequence. Their 
product gives then the corresponding average (residual) risk rate, 
R = L C, 
where the notation indicates the conceptual nature of these quantities as 
average or expected values. 
The uncertainty of the PRA results is expressed in probability distri-
butions around L and C. Both are often assumed in form of log-normal 
distributions. The magnitude of the uncertainty is often expressed by specify-
ing a confidence interval, containing e.g. 90 % of the distribution integral. 
The ratio, r 90 , of the upper and lower limits is used here for the band 
width characterization: 
[
upper l~m~t] 
lower l~m~t of 90 % confidence band. 
Actuarial data pertaining to individual events are related here to 
- -
the calculated expected L and C values: 
(6) 
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Let us consider the first occurrence of a particular failure, with 
a consequence c1, occurring at the operationtime öT 1 (after a proper 
reference time, T = O; i.e. 6T 1 = T1). Then, the consequence C, and the 
non-isotonic estimate for L, i.e. 
L = I 
(7) 
-
will be compared with C and L in an L-C plane. The estimate 1 1 will be called 
"apparent likelihood." 
Figure I shows the L-C plane in a log-log representation with both 
-
variables related to their respective expected values L or C, i.e. 
1 = log(L/L) is plotted vs. c =log (C/C). The expected value is indi-
cated as heavy circle at (0, 0). The risk equals the acceptable value, 
R,along a straight line with a slope of minus one, indicated as a heavy 
dashed line; it projects the "acceptable" risk, R, to higher and lower 
consequences with inversely vary1.ng occurrence rates. 
An actual event, with the consequence c1 and the apparent likeli-
hood 1 1, is represented by a point on the L-C plane. The corresponding 
"apparent risk," R 1, 
may be above or below the accepted risk line R. 
- -As noted above, the calculation of the expected values L and C 
(8) 
is not entirely accurate and the inaccuracies are represented as probability 
distribution functions (pdf) around L and C. 
However, the major uncertainty 1.n a comparison of an actual event 
rith expected values could just come frorn the statistical nature of 
:ailure events,from the fact that they may occur at any time. Given that 
:he system has not failed yet, the probability that it will do so in the 
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Fig. 1: Frequency vs. consequence diagram with confidence bands of the 
exponential and modified exponential density functions, f(t) and 
f (t) respectively. 
(J 
I I 
-
next interval dT is constant: LdT, when L is assumed to be constant. The 
corresponding density function, f(T), is exponential: 
- -LT f(T) = L e 
The "mean time to failure" for Eq. (9) is 
LlT = ..!.. 
L 
Also the spread in time values that results from the exponential 
distribution Eq. (9), without any uncertainty in L can be characterized 
by a 90 % confidence interval. The ratio of the corresponding upper to 
lower limits is denoted r~~' to indicate that it results from the expo-
nential distribution alone. The three time values for the median and the 
limits of the 90 % confidence interval for the exponential are given by 
T5 ln 
I 0.05 
= 
.95 "" -L L 
T50 
I 1 0.69 ex 
= -ln-
"" r90 "" 60 1 .5 -L 
T95 
I I 3.0 
-ln --
"" 1 .o5 -L 
For plotting these T-limits and the apparent likelihood values 
per Eq. (7) in Fig. I, all quantities are related to L: 
L log :- , 
L 
and for the percentile limits (T%) of Eq. (11): 
(l /T%) 
1% = log----
1 
fiT logT, 
% 
(9) 
(I 0) 
(I I) 
(12a) 
( 12b) 
The corresponding 1-values are shown in Fig. I as horizontal dotted lines, 
denoted by 15 , 150 , and 195 respectively. 
12 
As noted in Eqs.(1 1), the 90% confidence interval of the exponen-
tial spreads over a factor of 60. However, this spread is not symmetrical 
about the mean; it extends a factor of 20 toward the low t side and only 
a factor of 3 toward larger t . This is reflected in the range in which 
the apparent failure rates, L, are to be expected. Their range then exceeds 
the mean by a factor of 20 on the upside End only a factor of 3 on the downside. 
In addition to the spread of the exponential, one has to include 
the uncertainty distribution of L araund L, for which a log-normal distri-
bution is assumed [pln(~; a8 with a standard deviation 0. Averaging the 
exponential with pln results in a "modified exponential" density function, 
f (T): 
a 
00 
f (T) 
0 
-00 
For calculational details see Appendix 1. It is seen that f (T) 
0 
(13) 
depends on L as parameter in the same way as f(T) on L; it has L as factor 
and depends on LT. In the terminology of Eq. (13), f(T) per Eq. (9) ~s 
equal to f 0 (T): 
lim 
0 -+ 0 
f (T) 
a 
= f(T) 
The effect of averag~ng an exponential density function over an un-
certainty distribution for L becomes qualitatively evident by considering 
-
L-values that are larger or smaller than L. The larger L-values lead to 
steeper the smaller L-values to slower decreasing exponentials than given 
by Eq. (9). Figure 2 shows a comparison of f (T) = f 0 (T) wi th three modified 
exponentials, f (T), as defined by Eq. (13). The three log-normal uncertainty 
0 
distributions have 90 % confidence interval band widths with upper to lower 
fO"(t) 
[ 
1.00 
0.10 
0.01 +---,--r---r--r-----r---,--.------,----.--~--,----,---r--------1 
[t 0 
Fig. 2: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Modified exponential density functions, f (t), for a = 0.421; a = 0.978; 
a 
a = 1.400 compared with f(t) = f (t). Plottedis f /Las function of 0 a 
Lt. The three a-values correspond to ratios of upper to lower limit 
of the 90 % confidence intervals of the log-normal distribution for 
1 being r = 4, 25, and 100 respectively; r 90 = lfor cr = 0, given f (t). 90 0 
N 
Pl 
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limit ratios of r90 = 4, 2~ and 100 respectively. The corresponding cr-values 
are cr = 0.42I, a = 0.978 and a = I.400 respectively. 
The derivations of fcr and f 0 are as qualitatively expected. The values 
at T = 0 are increased; f (0) is given by Eq. (58) of App. I. The three 
a 
values are I.09, I.6I and 2.65 times t 0 (0) = L. The middle part of the 
modified density function is considerably lowered as compared to the un-
modified one, whereas at large times, f (T) decreases much slower than 
a 
f(T) which shows the effect of L-values that are much smaller than L. 
The modification of the exponential distribution by a variation ~n 
L will affect the width of the confidence band. Apparently, the 5 % integral at 
the left end of thehighly skewed distributionswill be reached at smaller 
times, where the decrease is roughly proportional to the increase of 
fcr(O) as compared to f 0 (0) = L. Figure 3 depicts as functions of a the va-
riations of the limits of the 90 % and 68 % confidence intervals as well 
as the median values (50 %). The 90 % confidence band limitations for 
r 90 = 100 arealso reflected in the corresponding L/L-band of Fig. I. 
The T-value at the 5 % integral leads to a large apparent L, about 50 tin1es 
L; the 95 % integral appears as a low L-value at about 0. I L. Thus, the 90 % 
confidence band for the modified exponential (with r 90 = IOO) extends 
over a factor of 500. This is only about 8 times more than for the ex-
ponential distribution alone. 
The lower part of Fig. I contains events that are not too far away 
from expected and thus identified failure modes. Events for which the 
apparent likelihood is much larger than the expected one, i.e. failures 
that are quite unexpected would be in the upper part of Fig. I. If they 
were nearly totally unexpected (L<<<L) they would be at even larger 
1-values than shown in Fig. I. However, most UFM-events arenot totally 
unexpected; the element of surprise is more in the apparent likelihood, 
rather than in the type of event per se. Approximate IFM and UFM domains, 
Fig. 3: 
\3 a 
10~--------------------~--~ 
95°/o 
Lt 
1.0 
median 
50o/o 
0.1 
15.85°/o 
ln r90 20 
= 1.644 
5o/o 
1 4 25 rgo 100 0.01 
0 0.5 1.0 0 1.5 
Modified exponential density function, f (t): Median values, limits 
0 
of the 68.3 % and 90% confidence intervals as function of o. The 
relative width r 90 of the 90 % confidence band are indicated on the 
o-ax~s. 
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overlapping to some extent, are indicated on the right of Fig. I, viewed 
to be connected through a gradual transition rather than being disjunct 
domains. 
A case 1n point for the not totally unexpected nature of UFM events 
are the two failures on U.S. nuclear power reactors, the Browns Ferry fire 
and the '.IMI-2 accident (see Sec. 5). A cable fire is not a totally une::pected 
incident nor is a "small LOCA" (loss of coolant accident), where "small" 
refers to the size of the operring through which coolant escapes. Nevertheless, 
the apparent likelihood, the magnitude of the (financial) consequences 
and the appearance of a "design" problern in either hardware or operational 
instructions qualify both incidents as UFM-events (comp. Ref. 2). The 
qualitative location of both accidents on the L-C plane is indicated in 
Fig. I. 
A maJor aspect in the consideration of the relation of the proba-
bilistic and event-oriented approaches 1s that after each failure a 
decision must be made on the course of action. In Ref. 2, the course of 
action has been made the basis for an accident classification, that also 
led to the distinction between IMF and UFM types of events. 
On the low end of the failure spectrum one will likely decide on 
"repair action only", (category IV of Ref. 2). By implementing this deci-
sion, one restores the likelihood of the failure to the value it had before 
and establishes a basis for forming an average failure rate. 
The next category of failures (category III) is characterized by the 
decision that "more-than-repair action" is called for. Whatever this action 
may consist of - whether hardware or software alterations are carried out 
only in the failed unit or are spread to other units of this technology -
the likelihood of a recurrence is reduced. 
The events in category II of Ref. 2 are even more ser1ous and reveal 
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through their apparent likelihood or their actual consequences a flaw in 
the previously accepted design. Then design modifications are called for 
such that a recurrence is either designed out or made at least much less 
likely. 
If in addition to the realization that a design modification is called 
for, the accident led to fatalities among the public, it was considered 
to be part of the category I. 
This categorization of failures or accident according to the subse-
quent course of action can be used to subdivide the L-C plane. The apparent 
likelihood and the actual consequences represent the new information that 
has been provided by the actual failure event. 
The domain for "repair action only" can be limited by the acceptable 
risk line, R, as indicated in Fig. 4. 
If, however, the apparent risk, R, was larger or even considerably 
-larger than R, one will have to determine whether a design flaw (UFM event) 
was more or less obviously involved in the accident. In this case a design 
~odification would be called for. 
But if the failure for which R >> R ~s clearly an IFM event, the 
decision ~s more difficult. Considering the large possible spread in the 
apparent likelihood, the specific event could well have an acceptable L 
that might prevail asymptotically. Arguing on the basis of probabilistic 
considerations alone, one could decide to wait for more failures to occur 
so that average values L and C can be better established. But it appears 
more likely that a R-value that is considerably larger than R will 
instigate more-than-repair action or even the design modification course 
of action. Approximate domains for these courses of action are indicated 
~n Fig. 4. The magnitude of these domains could be different for different 
technologies. The categorization in Fig. 4 is based upon Ref. 2 which addressed 
the nuclear power technology. 
l=log L 
L 
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Fig. 4: Frequency vs. consequence diagram with lines of constant apparent 
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repair" and "design rnodifications". 
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The ma1 n conclusions to be drawn from this discussion of courses of 
action and their representation on an L-C plane are the following: 
Due to the large spread of the apparent likelihood and risk (L and 
R), especially on the upside, a large fraction of IFM events can be 
,.. 
expected to occur with an R-value considerably above the acceptable 
value R. 
In many of these cases the decision maker can be expected to call 
for more-than-repair action. 
Thus, in addition to system improvements following UFM accidents, 
one can expect more-than-repair action also for a considerable nurober 
of IFM-events. 
In effect then, the large variability of the outcomes of failure 
events leads to decisions that exert an evolutionary pressure toward 
systern irnprovernent. 
In any case, when systerns are rnodified based on the experience for 
single or few failure events, the basis for establishing average 
rates, L, or consequences (C) by actuarial data erodes. Then, a statistical, 
event-oriented analysis airning at a trending investigation should be 
employed for the evaluation of the technical progress as exhibited 
by the actuarial data on failures. 
Under the influence of an ongoing evolutionary pressure toward system 
improvernent, risk seems to become a dynamic concept rather than being 
a static one. In risk dynamics investigations one would then explicitly 
address the parameters and forces that affect the dynamics behavior, 
especially the sign and the rate of changes of risk and failure rate, 
quantities that could be rnore irnportant than sorne rather uncertain 
absolute values. 
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III. GENERALIZED MODEL FOR STATISTICAL TREND ANALYSIS USING ISOTONIC 
REGRESSION 
III. I Failure Rates and Risk 
The earlier version of the STA model is reviewed in Sec. I. It 
pertained to maJor UFM events that were considered so serious that re-
currence had to be precluded by proper system modification. The generalized 
model of an event-oriented failure analysis to be presented here can also 
be applied to IFM incidents. It needs no langer to be assumed that subsequent 
system modifications have to eliminate the corresponding A. The trend 
search options have also been generalized. Decreasing as well as increasing 
failure rate trends can be searched for and if needed, possible indications 
of a trend reversal can be investigated. 
The primary applications of this procedure LS to the analysis of 
failure data of systems that are an the one hand 
sufficiently complex so that system modifications are made an them, 
an the other that 
failures are infrequent, so that the assemblage of a sufficient data 
base for the calculation of average occurrence rates LS not meaningful 
between changes in the system's safety characteristic. 
The basic model assumptions are that the potential failures can be 
described by rates, Aik' where the index i refers to the individual unit 
and k to the type of failure, and that the appearance of any one of these 
failures is a statistical phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the Aik are assumed to be independent of time. Any 
variation of the occurrence rates, Aik' be it a reduction through retro-
fittingor an increase due to age-effects is formally described by applicat]on 
of alteration factors: a~k(T)· see Eq. (19) . 
L ' 
Occasionally, a change in a system leads to a new failure possibility; 
the corresponding a-value would then be zero prior to that time and unity 
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thereafter. The new failure possibility may have been built in - along with 
a repair - inadvertently, or a change in a system might now allow a failure 
to occur which could not happen before. This is a typical violation of the 
statistical independence of failures. A practical example is the "failure 
repair" (debugging) in computer software that makes program parts accessable 
(including the errors in these parts) that could not be reached before 
the "repair " (see Ref. 9). 
It Ls noted here that the isotonic regression estimation as such 
does not make use of the statistical independence. Only in the test of 
the trend significance is the assumption of statistical independence 
employed to determine, e.g. the probability for a zero trend hypothesis 
to be descriptive of the actuarial data. 
Since the event-oriented analysis yields results only at discrete 
points along the time axis, at the times of failures, only average values 
AK 
over the time intervals between failures are needed. Let aik be the average 
over the K-th failure interval (~TK): 
( 14) 
A 
If the aik (T) I, the failure rate for the i~h system LS gLven by: 
(15) 
where the dots indicate an unknown upper limit Ln the number of possible 
failures. 
For the description of the varLous units in a population of systems, 
one needs the individual start-up dates and operational schedules. Let 
the fraction of the K-th interval that the uni t i operates be denoted 
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by wiK. Then, wiK = 1 if the unit ~ operates throughout the K-thinterval. 
The total AK is then given by 
\ A(i) failures 
l wiK i year 
Since the analysis ~s retrospective for each interval the wiK are known 
for the evaluation of the K-th failure. 
(16) 
The sum of the individual fractions of the operation of these systems 
~n the K-th interval is 
~T.  plant years 
~tK year (17) 
where ~TiK is the operation time of the i-th unit in the K-th interval 
and ~tK the calendar time between the K-th and the K-1st failures. If all 
~TiK equal ~tK' QK is equal to the number ofunits considered. Dividing 
AK by QK gives the failure rate per plant year in the interval prior the 
K-th event 
AK failures 
1K = QK plant year • (18) 
With alteration factors included which largely describe improvements 
derived from lessons from previous failures one has the respective reduced 
rates in the K-th interval: 
K 
Aik = 
AK 
8 ik Aik' (19) 
A(i) I K K k Aik (20) 
I 
k 
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= \' ,,, A(i) 
L ""iK K ' i 
and LK agaLn from Eq. (18). 
The isotonic regression procedure, briefly described Ln Sec. I, 
aims at estimating the rates LK. The resulting estimate is denoted by 
~ 
LK. This STA estimate is to be interpreted as the average failure rate 
(21) 
during the recent time interval, which is either ßTK alone, or an extended 
interval as far back as the isotonic regression includes ßTk-values in the 
averaging process. What the recent failure then provides is - in a sense -
a "measurement" of the average rate in the preceding interval, though subject 
to statistical variations. 
By applying the distinction between identified and unidentified failure 
modes (IFM and UFM respectively), one can subdivide all A into these two 
groups: 
(22) 
Only the A-values Ln the IFM part can be calculated by the synthesis proce-
dure of PRA. 
Since the consequences of accidents are treated here merely through 
a categorization of their severity, the evaluated failures rates, LK' 
apply only to frequencies of events Ln such a category. Nevertheless, the 
formal definition of the risk rate is given here also to establish the re-
lation to the frequency formulas. 
In order to obtain the risk, the failure rates need to be combined 
with estimates of the consequences Cik for each path. The Cik refer to 
any type of risk, such as repair cost or health hazard. However, in the 
same way as for the A , there are also alteration factors a:K for the 
Lk 
consequences that result from changes in the system through retrofitting. 
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As for the A • these changes may in some cases also lead to an increase; 
the corresponding ac would then be larger than unity. 
For an individual technical system (a "unit") as well as a group or 
a "population" of such systems one obtains in analogy to the failure 
rates the following risk rates: 
p(i) I K K = Aik cik' K k 
~ I p(i) =- wiK nK i K 
with 
and P = '. ,,, p(i) K L LViK K 
1 
PK 
= 
nK 
Here, ~ is the "residual risk", i.e. the risk remaining after the K-th 
failure, where the lessons learned from earlier failures have probably 
led to a reduction of the risk. 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
III. 2 Is.otonic Regression Analysis for Monotoneaus Trends and Trend Reversals 
As indicated in Sec. I, the isotonic regression search for a declining 
failure rate is performed as a search for increasing spacings t.Tk. Mathematically 
one solves the minimization problern 
K 
l: minimum, (27) 
k=l 
subject to the order restriction 
(28) 
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Alternately, in a search for increasing failure rates, the order restriction 
is just reversed: 
(29) 
The inverse ~Tk give the respective failure rates, per Eq. (2). 
The searches for decreasing and increasing trends may be combined 
in a search for a trend reversal. The mathematical formulation ~s an 
extension of the minimum problem, Eq. (27), but both order restrictions 
appear ~n combination; the interval in which trend reversal begins is denoted 
At first, all intervals are used individually in K trial solutions 
to determine the value (S2 ) of the residual of the minimum problern K' 
K I (~ K' 
K k=I Tk 
minimum , 
subject to the order restriction 
(or reversed) for K' = I, 
K I 
> ~T ' 1 K+ 
... K. Subsequently, the ~~ belanging to the 
K 
(30) 
(3 I) 
1 2 . . d . sma lest S LS des~gnate as the trend reversal ~nterval. The corresponding 
K 
... 
K ~Tk-values are the final r~sult of the search (indicated by ) : 
(32) 
with K from 
m~n es;,) (33) 
23 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF TRENDS 
The significance of a trend that has been tentatively identified by 
statistical trend analysis of the actuarial failure data can be evaluated 
basically in two different ways, by purely statistical rneans, or by directly 
ernploying the technical inforrnation on systern changes. 
IV. 1 Statistical Trend Significance Evaluation 
The statistical procedures consist of testing the data for a constant 
average spacing (null hypothesis, H ) or of testing the significance of 
0 
coefficients of a fit. The rnost cornrnon tests are concerned with linear 
fits, where the fit rnay be on any scale (e.g. linear or logarithrnic). 
The isotonic regression does not yield coefficients. Thus, it appears 
to be rnore appropriate to subject the data to the H -test rnentioned above 
0 
(see Refs. 8 and 1). 
The result of the H test ~s expressed in terrns of a percentile a, 
0 
which - in a sense is the probability for the set of data to be part 
of a sequence with a constant failure rate. If a is sufficiently srnall, 
H can be rejected and the alternate hypothesis (DFR) accepted. The evalua-
o 
tion of a ~s based upon the assurnption of statistical independence. 
In the case of a trend reversal analysis, the two branches have to 
be subjected individually to H tests; the declining and the increasing 
0 
branches rnust be significant individually to suggest a real trend reversal. 
+ -Let a and a be the two percentiles. An a-value for the trend reversal 
+ + -
case (say a-) can be obtained by cornbining a and a . Naturally, the 
data requirernents for establishing a trend reversal are rnore extensive 
than for a single trend. 
Although the isotonic regression does not yield coefficients as a 
fit, a trend reversal evaluation can also be based on a confidence interval 
band araund the estirnate ~· Procedures to devise such a confidence band 
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are under consideration. Presented here are only some fundamentals that 
can be readily derived from the exponentiality of the density function for 
individual events and from some special considerations for groupings that 
appear with the same L-value in the isotonic regression. 
The basic assumption is that the ~-values are the respective mean 
values of exponential density functions. This preliminary evaluation is, 
in addition, based on the assumption of statistical independence. Further-
more, the modification of the exponential density function that was intro-
duced above for calculated L-values, does not apply here. 
A 68.3 % confidence band is deemed suitable for the trend significance 
evaluation. It will be shown below that for large groupings of intervals 
the 68.3 % interval approaches asymptotically the 2a-interval of anormal 
distribution. 
The time-boundaries for the 90 % confidence interval were given in 
Eq. ( 12). The corres.ponding L-values for the 68 % (short for 68. 3) interval 
are 
(34) 
where 1kis to be taken as the isotonic regression estimate ~· 
If all Lk come out to be different, the 68 % interval can be obtained 
by applying Eq. (34) directly and independently to each L-estimate: 
(11<) 16 > 68.3% interval of ~ > (Lk) 84 (35) 
An example of this application is given ~n Sec. V. 
For all-different ~· Eq. (35) yields a monotoneaus confidence band, 
although the individual intervals for neighbouring events normally overlap. 
Then, an independent variation of L-values within this band could violate 
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the trend. However, by imposing the order restriction, the isotonic regres-
sion affects the independency of the estimators by disallowing an L-estimate 
tobe larger than the previous one (in an analysis for DFR). This re-
quires an evaluation of the confidence band by properly correlating neigh-
bauring interval. In general, one can expect the confidence interval to 
become narrower if this correlation is introduced. 
If the ~ are not all different, the ßTk-values appear averaged for 
each group of equal ~· Let ~(n) be that common value: 
L~(n) = L = L ~ k+l = ~+n-1 (36) 
The value ~(n) is then a particular finding in a historical sequence of 
events that cannot be repeated. 
· · d" "b · d ~(n) · · d The quest1on for the uncerta1nty 1str1 ut1on aroun L 1s 1nverte 
as compared with the question that leads to the Poisson distribution 
- n -n (n) e 
n! 
(37) 
The latter gives the probability for a variety of particular values n, when 
~ is the corresponding average. Here, n is a specific historical realization 
and we ask for the variety of n that could be associated with this particular 
n-value. 
The case n = I has been discussed ahove. In terms of the general 
formulation used in the following, the corresponding exponential distribu-
tion 1s written as 
with 
-T 
g (T) = e I 
n. 
The superscript indicates n = I. 
(37) 
(38) 
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The average n (called here T for short) is the average number of 
ßT(I)_intervals that can be associated with the actual finding of n = I, 
where ßT(I) = 1/~(l). Equation (37) gives the corresponding density function. 
If n values of L agree, as in Eq. (36), one expects a smaller confidence 
band than for a single event. For n = 2 one obtains 
-T 
e (39) 
Thus, the density function for two events is already less skewed than the 
exponential, Eq. (37). It approaches zero for decreasing value of T (or ~). 
with 
and 
In general, the density function for T is the gamma distribution: 
n-1 T -T g ( T ) = ......,......__,.._,.. e 
n (n-1)! 
ßT 
n 
The 
T = 
k+n-1 
L ßTk, 
k'=k 
expectation 
CO 
J Tg (T) dT n 
0 
value of g (T) 
n 
= n, 
is 
(40) 
(41 a) 
(41b) 
(42) 
s1nce the found n events have been associated with the expectation value. 
For large n, the gamma distribution approaches the normal distribu-
tion around the max1mum value T : 
m 
with 
0 = 
T-T 
m 
T 
m 
I 
[2;;1 e 
'2 0 
2 a2 (43) 
(44a) 
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T = n-I m (44b) 
and 
I I 
a = -- :::: -
IT lrl (44c) 
m 
The median and the 68.3 % interval for the gamma distribution are 
depicted in Fig. 5 for n = I through 8, all quantities related to the mean 
value T = n. The median slowly approaches the mean as the distribution 
becomes more symmetrical and approaches the Gaussian, Eq. (43). The 68.3 % 
intervals are quite symmetric on the linear scale of Fig. 5, already for 
n = I. 
In general, if the early and later confidence intervals do not 
overlap and are well separated, one will consider a trend to be statistically 
significant. Procedures for a quantification of the significance for con-
fidence intervals around an isotonic regression result are under considera-
tion. 
IV.2 System Improvement Assessment and Trend Complement 
If through repair action after a failure the previous state of the 
system, including the chance for a recurrence of that particular failure, 
has been fully restored, the failure rate should remain constant (assuming 
that system deterioration is prevented by proper maintenance). Thus, a 
declining failure rate can only result from the "more-than-repair" course 
of action after failures, or from improvements that are unrelated to 
the failure in existing systems. Thirdly, a decrease in the failure rate 
per operating year can be achieved by deploying new safer systems and by 
decommissioning obsolete ones. The improved safety of new units may in part 
result from lessons learned from earlier failures. All three effects are 
discussed in the following and are combined to provide a computed estimate 
1: 
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of the trend or a trend complement for each interva1 following a failure. 
Thus, the time after the last failure is considered; the corresponding STA 
estimate is LK and from it one obtains the annual rate, A: 
(45) 
In a technology, such as nuclear power reactors, were PRA methods 
are extensively employed, one can assess the system improvements in terms 
PRA 
of oAK , since the technical specifics of the changes are known. In the 
case of failure-unrelated improvements, one can directly deduct oAPRA from K 
the recent A estimate. We therefore equate it to a A-change: 
oA(K+l)(t) PRA = oA(K+l)(t) for failure-unrelated changes. (46) 
The index (K+l) in parenthesis indicates a location "somewhere" ~n the K+l 8 t 
interval, and "t" the time of the change within this interval. 
For the failure related changes ~n the system the A-change could also 
be equated with the PRA-estimate: 
K 
oi\(K+I)(t) = PRA oAK (t); 
the superscript K on AK and the subscript K on AK indicate the relation 
(47) 
to the K-th failure. In this case one can possibly improve the oA-estimate 
by directly using the apparent AK for the appearance of that particular 
failure. Suppose this failure occurred for the first time; subsequently 
more-than-repair action deemed necessary. Then, the entire operational 
period T , disregarding interruptions of the time scale by other failures, 
gives the apparent rate 
I 
AK = T, 
K 
as in Eq. (7). The 
(48) 
change of the apparent A is then obtained by multiplying 
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with the relative change as assessed by PRA, which is the same as multiplying 
the RHS of Eq. (47) with the ratio of apparent and PRA values of A: 
(49) 
It appears that oA per Eq. (49) is preferable to Eq. (47) s~nce 
oAK is applied as a change of AK which in itself contains the K-th failure 
1.n its "apparent" timing. 
* If oA(K+l)(t) denotes the A-changes through system deplo~~ent and 
decommissioning, and if ~(K+l)(t) denotes the corresponding variation of ~. 
then one obtains an estimate for the 1-complement after the K-th failure 
prior to the K+lst one (during the K+l interval): 
(50) 
For t = tK, the time of the K-th failure, the o-quantities disappear. Thus, 
(51) 
At the time of the K+lst failure one then obtains - within the un-
certainty band of the isotonic regression estimate - an estimate of the 
average L in the previous interval, which over several intervals should be 
similar to the trend calculated in Eq. (50). In a single interval, the trend 
complement per Eq. (50) should be much more accurate than the difference bet-
ween two isotonic regress: on estimators If e.g. if 6 FK+l is incidentally 
smaller or equal to theprevious6T, the value of LK+l would be equal to the 
(newly calculated) LK· a calculated trend complement however could indicate 
' 
a significant improvement for this period. 
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V. TREND ANALYSIS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE U.S. 
As discussed in Ref. 2, there were five nuclear reactor failures 
in the U.S. that provided considerable learning experience for the evolution 
of commercial nuclear power in the U.S., though three of these failures 
did not occur on commercial plants. Figure 6 presents the results obtained 
in Ref. 2 as a heavy solid histogram on a logarithmic scale. The Lk values 
are embedded in a 68.3 % confidence band, calculated for single events from 
Eq. (34). On the log-scale all of these confidence intervals have the same 
-1 -1 
width, from about 1.84 to 0.17 times the mean. 
Connecting the lower end of the first interval with the upper end of 
the last one and vice versa gives lower and upper statistical limits 
of the trend in the confidence band of a factor of 5 as lower and a factor 
of 350 as upper statistical trend limits respectively, with a factor of 
50 being the mean value. Furthermore, the null hypothesis test (comp. Sec. IV) 
gives a = I %, i.e. a I % probability for no trend. Thus, H is to be 
0 
rejected. Both findings strongly suggest that the trend is statistically 
significant. 
But, since all five failures led to considerable learning experience, 
reflected in system improvements, there are sound technical reasons for a 
DFR-trend, in addition to the statistical evidence. 
An analysis of failures in a certain category normally includes IFM 
and UFM events. Figure 6 shows only UFM failures since there was no con-
tribution of IFM accidents in this class of severity. 
The statistical trend analysis may be extended to the period beyend 
the most recent failure, provided that sufficient operational time has 
been accumulated. So is, at the time of this writing, the number of operating 
years of U.S. power reactors since March 1979 (TMI-2 accident) already 
!arger than in the previous interval. This suggests a reduction of the 
post-TMI-2 failure rate already from a statistical point of view. A more 
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roeaningful estiroate can however be obtained from a FRA-evaluation of the 
recent systero iroproveroents in terros of a coroplement as described above. 
Also plotted in Fig. 6 is a histogram of the historical average 
-H 
values, Lk, that are obtained by dividing all failures by the entire operating 
-H period, as given by Eq. (5). It is seen that the Lk-values have also a 
declining trend though to a considerably lesser degree than the Lk, Actually, 
-H 
the Lk drift away froro ~ on the upside, by about a factor of three at the 
last failure~ 
This brings up a roore general question, that ~s also posed for other 
technologies, such as large dams or boilers aboard steam ships: What ~s 
the current expected rate for roajor failure? Are estiroates of that rate 
as derived froro actuarial data better described by the recent values of 
-H the average historical rate, LK' by the STA esti~ate, LK, or by an assess-
roent of the state-of-the-art safety characteristic? 
-H The major difference between the estiroates LK and LK ~s in the treat-
roent of UFM failures that happened early in the evolution of a technology: 
-H In LK all failures have the saroe contribution if the failure possibility 
has been retained or if it has been eliroinated after the failure. In the trend 
analysis estiroate on the other hand, early failures that occurred with a 
high apparent rate are noted as such, but they affect later rates only 
to the extent of their recurrence; if they do not recur, they affect sub-
sequent rates ~n the sense that the operation times, that determined the 
early high rates, roust not be included in the calculation of later rates. 
This appears to be a proper way to assess failure rates after system changes. 
The third possibility, the assessment of the state-of-the-art safety 
characteristics does not a~ro at and thus does not provide a representation 
of the failure rate of a grown and evolving population of various types 
of systems. In using it as a projection one disregards earlier failures com-
pletely. A sequence of state-of-the-art assessments also provides trend ~n-
formation that is however not directly based on actuarial failure event spac~ngs. 
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Therefore, the evaluation of the actuarial data in terms of a failure 
rate trend in the presented manner appears to be a good compromise between 
the historical average and the state-of-the-art assessments. It accounts 
fully for the failures in the evolving technology, including early failures 
with the high rates prevalent at these times, and it allows for system 
improvements, if demonstrated ~n the actuarial data, to properly affect 
the estimates of the most recent failure rates. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As technologies evolve, along with general technical progress as 
well as through learning from operating experience, failure rates and 
associated risks vary with time, normally in the direction of improved 
safety performance. The assessment of this variation in form of a trend 
of failure rate is of importance for a control of the success of past 
measures and a basis for decisions on future actions. 
The methodology for statistical trend analysis (STA) as presented 
here is based upon the evaluation of actuarial data on the temporal spacings 
between failure events, within a certain category. It is a generalization 
of a somewhat simpler version published earlier. The domain of application 
is that middle ground between the frequent failures in a population of a 
large number of identical units and the extremely rare events for which no 
actuarial information is available. The assessment results in the two latter 
frequency domains are (well defined) average values of actuarial data on 
the one hand and PRA-synthesized expected values on the other. In the 
middle ground one analyzes sparse data that are assembled while a technology, 
a system or a component continue to change. 
The generalizations consist of allowing for partial changes in individual 
failure rates as well as additions of new failures that manifest themselves 
in a trend moderation on even a trend reversal. A special analysis procedure 
for trend reversal is presented. 
The event-oriented nature of this consideration is contrasted in a 
Special discussion with the expectation values of PRA. The uncertainties 
of the PRA-calculated frequencies lead to a modified exponential density 
function for the occurrence chance of a failure along the time axis. The 
corresponding confidence intervals are displayed in a frequency vs. con-
sequence (L vs. C) diagram in which the average risk (R) is shown as a 
diagonal base line. Individual failure events can be represented by ''points," 
with their apparent consequences and occurrence rates as respective coordinates. 
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Three categories of actions after failures are considered and represented 
as domains in this diagram. It is plausible to assume that individual 
events stimulate "more-than-repair" action or even "design modifications" 
if they are well above the R base-line. This naturally leads to an evolu-
tionary pressure toward system improvement. 
The evaluation of the significance of tentatively identified trends 
1s discussed. Statistical evaluations are discussed in the form of an 
"alternate vs. null hypothesis" test and in form of a confidence band 
around the trend histogram. In addition, an extensive and detailed evalua-
tion of prior technical information on system changes in terms of a PRA-
computed complement to an STA-derived trend is proposed as an independent 
trend measure. Both quantities should mutually support each other. 
A previously published statistical analysis of major failures on 
U.S. power reactors and developmental precursors was used as an example to 
illustrate the trend significance information. The trend obtained suggests 
an average factor of 50 in the reduction of the failure rates with factors 
of 5 and 350 as extreme boundaries. The null hypothesis evaluation indicates 
a I % probability for the data to be compatible with a constant failure rate. 
Taking 5 % as a typical criterion indicates that the null hypothesis 1s 
to be rejected. This result is supported by the consideration of the system 
modifications that were implemented either independently or as a result of 
lessons learned from these failures. 
pared: 
Finally, three trending description concepts were qualitatively com-
-H The historical average failure rate, L , is the least sensitive 
description, s1nce it retains past failures including the ones 
that occurred early in the evolution of a technology with an unaltered 
-H 
contribution to the numerator of L . 
The statistical trend analysis result (STA). 
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The state-of-the-art projection based on either a single or sequence 
of several PRA calculations. 
The STA result appears to be an adequate compromise that accounts 
fully for failures during the technology evolution (with high rates 
if they were prevalent at early times) but it also allows for system ~m­
provements to properly affect the estimates of the most recent failure rates, 
if such improvements are demonstrated in the actuarial data on failure 
spacings. 
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APPENDIX No. 
The Modified Exponential Den5ity Function 
The log-normal di5tribution 
1 
--- exp (- ---2-), rz 2a l21ra~ 
normalized a5 
CO 
J 
-co 
18 employed to de5cribe the uncertainty variation of the time con5tant L 
in the exponential density function 
f (t) = L e-Lt. 
0 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
Averaging Eq. (56) with pln (L/L) yield5 the modified exponential den5ity 
function a5 defined in Eq. (13): 
CO (ln ~) 2 
- I L L - 1 L L f (t) = L = exp(- = Lt) exp(-
2a2 
) dln -
a L L /27f<J2 L 
-oo 
(57) 
The integral Eq. (57) 18 calculated numerically a5 function of Ltwith a 
a5 parameter. The re5ult5 for three a-value5 are pre5ented 1n Fig. 3. 
The value5 for t = 0 can be evaluated analytically: 
f (O) 
a 
- i/2 1 e (58) 
